SYRIAN KURDS AS A U.S. ALLY------ Cooperation & Complications
PREFACE
THIS COLLECTION OF ESSAYS explores how the United States can work with—or, in some cases, around—the various actors in heavily Kurdish-populated northern Syria to advance the fight against the Islamic State (IS) and to create long-term stability.
Successive pieces look at the Kurds themselves, Turkey, Arabs in the Kurdish-controlled area, the Syrian Arab opposition, the Iraqi Kurds, and Russia. All of these parties are engaged in complex interactions; none fully share U.S. interests—although many have interests that overlap with or differ from those of the United States.
The dominant Kurdish actor in Syria is the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat; PYD) and its associated military, the People’s Defense Units (Yekineyen Parastina Gel; YPG). One of the more contentious issues is the relationship between the PYD and the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), from which it sprang. The PKK is designated as a terrorist group by the United States and, of course, by Turkey, which has lost tens of thousands dead in the decades-long struggle against the PKK. Rather than disputing how close or how far the two groups are now, the focus here is on the U.S. interest, which is getting the PYD to separate itself fully from the PKK. What should concern policymakers is shaping the future, not waging disputes about the past or even the present.
These essays thus seek to make practical, concrete recommendations about U.S. policies. They contain no magic formulas—only suggestions that, with hard work and skillful diplomacy, may lead to modest progress.
The proposals here seem consistent with President-elect Donald Trump’s statements about his objectives and, though pushing them to the limits, largely in line with President Obama’s policies. Defeating IS in Syria is one objective that both Trump and Obama see as a high priority; indeed, both have placed much emphasis on the battle against IS. And although Trump claimed during the presidential debates that he would defeat IS more quickly than Obama has, he faces the same major challenge as his predecessor: from whence will come the ground forces?
Since the two most likely sources of ground forces are the PYD and Turkish-backed elements—if not Turkey itself—presumably aided by U.S. Special Forces,1 these essays explore how best to work with these two actors who are unfriendly with each other but potentially helpful to the United States. To make good on Trump’s pledge to step up the battle against IS, his team will be well advised to find ways to resolve the PYD-Turkey conundrum.
Patrick Clawson,
editor
NOTES
1.Trump referred to NATO forces and regional states doing more in the battle against IS; for instance, in the September 2016 presidential debate, he said, “I think we have to get NATO to go into the Middle East with us, in addition to surrounding nations, and we have to knock the hell out of ISIS, and we have to do it fast.” Earlier, in the March 2016 primary debate, he said about the anti-IS battle, “I would listen to the generals, but I’m hearing numbers of 20,000−30,000,” implying that would be the total force needed against IS in both Syria and Iraq. Neither these quotes nor any other statements suggest he was proposing to commit U.S. ground troops (other than Special Forces). And, of course, one of those NATO allies is Turkey.
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